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時間:2021-01-06浏覽:10設置

講座題目:新商科:新時代的整合者

主講人:霍寶鋒  教授

时  间: 2021110周日13:30-14:15

地  点: 騰訊會議:825-699-292 /中北校區理科大樓A302  

主  办:  新興市場服務管理研究團隊、統計交叉科學研究團隊

講座內容簡介:

報告簡介:將報告新商科的時代背景、基本理念、部分商學院的探索。

主講人簡介:

霍寶鋒博士是天津大学管理与经济学部主任、运营管理领域的讲席教授、博士生导师、国家杰出青年基金获得者,Elsevier中國高被引學者。全國工商管理專業學位研究生教育指導委員會委員、天津市社科聯副主席(兼職)、天津市管理學科評議召集人。擁有香港中文大學運營管理專業的哲學博士學位和天津大學管理科學與工程專業的工學碩士和管理信息系統專業的工學學士學位。研究與教學領域包括運營管理、物流與供應鏈管理。論文發表在Journal of Operations Management, Production and Operations Management, Journal of Supply Chain Management, IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, International Journal of Operations and Production Management, Journal of Business Logistics, International Journal of Production Research, International Journal of Production Economics, Information & Management, Business Horizons,《管理科學學報》、《系統工程理論與實踐》、《科研管理》等期刊。擔任《天津大學學報(社會科學)》主編、Journal of Operations Management副主編、International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management高级副主編、Production and Operations Management編委、IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management編委, International Journal of Operations & Production Management編委,International Journal of Production Economics 編委, Industrial Management & Data Systems編委。

 

 

 

講座題目Adulteration or not? traceability, government regulation and competition.

主講人: 周偉華 教授

时  间: 2021110日(周日)14:15-15:00

地  点: 騰訊會議:825-699-292 /中北校區理科大樓A302  

主  办:  新興市場服務管理研究團隊、統計交叉科學研究團隊

主講人簡介:

周偉華,教授、博士生导师(供应链管理方向)。浙江大学“求是青年學者”。曾受國家留學基金委資助在斯坦福開展合作研究。現任浙江大學數據分析和管理國際研究中心主任,管理學院副院長,浙江大學“大數據+分析和管理”創新團隊首席專家,浙江省高校水平創新團隊“數據分析和管理”負責人,浙江大學-麻省理工大學“食品供應鏈系統化風險管理”項目中方負責人。兼任中國優選法統籌法與經濟數學研究會服務科學與運作管理分會副理事長;管理科學工程協會長三角協同管理研究會副理事長;中國運籌學會隨機服務與運作管理分會常務理事;浙江省技術經濟和管理現代化研究會副理事長;中國管理現代化研究會運作管理專業委員會專業委員;管理科學與工程學會理事;《管理工程學報》、《Modern Supply Chain Research and Applications》編委。

近年來,圍繞供應鏈金融,數據驅動管理,農産品供應鏈從事供應鏈管理方面的教學與科研工作,重點研究供應鏈中的優化控制策略和協作競爭策略,解決/分析了制造業供應鏈、農産品供應鏈中的相關問題。目前在國內外重要學術刊物上發表論文30余篇,包括發表在Management ScienceOperations ResearchProduction and Operations Management、管理世界、經濟要參、管理工程學報等國內外頂級刊物。已出版專著3本、教材1本。

講座內容簡介:

We analyze farmers' adulteration behavior in two competing supply chains: traceable supply chain (TSC) and untraceable supply chain (USC). Each supply chain includes an upstream farmer and a downstream vendor. The upstream farmer might adulterate his food and sell it to the downstream vendor. The government is responsible for food safety and inspects the vendor in the market. For the TSC, food products are marked with the identity of the upstream farmer, and if the government find traceable products adulterated, he imposes a penalty on the farmer, while in the USC, the producer of the food (farmer) cannot be identified, so the government directly punishes the vendor if the food is found adulterated. We fully characterize the farmer's equilibrium adulteration behavior considering the effect of traceability and competition. Besides, we analyze how the cost for traceability, the initial quality difference of two SCs, the level of quality enhancement after adulteration, and the government's penalty jointly impact the farmer's adulteration behaviors. Contrary to the common wisdom that a higher penalty can inhibit adulteration behavior, our results demonstrate that there exist conditions under which the supply chain's traceability may backfire and inadvertently leads the farm to adulterate when the government imposes a higher penalty. Furthermore, empirical analysis with actual data on government sampling results also validates our theoretical results.  



講座題目Emergency supplies distribution for early disaster response operations under demand information asymmetry

主講人:舒嘉  教授

時間: 2021110日(周日)15:00-15:45

地點: 騰訊會議:825-699-292 /中北校區理科大樓A302  

主辦:  新興市場服務管理研究團隊、統計交叉科學研究團隊

主講人簡介:

舒嘉,東南大學/電子科技大學經管學院教授、博士生導師、副院長。在新加坡國立大學和美國麻省理工學院聯合培養獲得管理科學博士學位,回東南大學任教之前曾在美國和新加坡的大學有任教經曆。主要從事物流、交通運輸與供應鏈管理的研究工作。在Operations ResearchTransportation ScienceINFORMS Journal on Computing發表論文7篇。部分研究成果入選美國麻省理工學院斯隆管理學院研究生課程講義、獲得了包括美國工程院院士,美國管理科學學會前主席,美國INFORMS Fellow等管理科學領域知名科學家的引用、肯定和好評。

講座內容簡介:

Quick response to the urgent demands in the affected areas after a disaster through a timely and effective distributing emergency supplies is of great importance in reducing disaster impact. In this study, we consider emergency supplies distribution for early disaster response operations under uncertainty, and propose a single-commodity, two-stage robust model that determines the number of commodities to be distributed from relief facilities to affected areas in a multi-sourcing disaster relief logistics network. In the early response stage after a disaster, the providers of relief-demand information take communities as the statistical standard, but the actual demanders include not only the community population but also the floating population. The resulting demand information asymmetry is the main reason for an uncertain demand, which is the uncertain parameter in our model. Meanwhile, the two stages are defined with respect to demand information asymmetry, and we use the upper bounds, the lower bounds, and the most likely values of uncertain demands to define an uncertainty set. The objective is to minimize the sum of the first-stage cost and the worst-case second-stage cost among all possible realizations of uncertain demands in the uncertainty set. We illustrate the advantage of our model on a case study concerning the 2010 Yushu earthquake in P.R. China. The computational results demonstrate that the two-stage robust model outperforms the deterministic and scenario-based two-stage stochastic models for the same problem.


講座題目Making the Most of Your Regret: Workers’ Relocation Decisions in On-Demand Platforms

主講人:蔣忠中 教授

時間: 2021110日(周日)15:45-16:30

地點: 騰訊會議:825-699-292 /中北校區理科大樓A302  

主辦:  新興市場服務管理研究團隊、統計交叉科學研究團隊

主講人簡介:

蔣忠中,现任东北大学工商管理学院院长、教授(破格)、博導,入選國家級人才計劃青年人才,行爲與服務運作管理研究所所長;曾任美國明尼蘇達大學訪問教授,國家自然科學基金委創新研究群體及國際重大合作項目骨幹成員;兼任國際期刊International Journal of Engineering Business Management副主編、中国运筹学会随机服务与运作管理分会常务理事、中国运筹学会行为运筹与管理分会常务理事、中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会服务科学与运作管理分会常务理事、中国管理科学与工程学会理事、中国系统工程学会智能制造系统工程专业委员会委员、辽宁省工业和信息化厅服务型制造专家等。

近年來,圍繞電子商務與共享經濟、行爲運作與收益管理、物流與供應鏈優化、服務運作與服務型制造等領域承擔國家自然科學基金青年、面上及重點項目等多項;在MSOMNRLTRBEJOROMEGADSSAORCORTREIEEE Trans.、管理科學學報等國內外頂級/重要學術期刊發表論著60余篇,獲省部級優秀成果獎12項及省部級領導批示2項;榮獲遼甯青年科技獎、遼甯省“興遼英才計劃”首屆青年拔尖人才、遼甯省“百千萬人才工程”百層次人才、遼甯省高校傑出青年學者、沈陽市高層次領軍人才、沈陽市青年崗位能手等榮譽。 

講座內容簡介:

We have witnessed a rapid rise of on-demand platforms, such as Uber, in the past few years. While these platforms allow workers to choose their own working hours, they have limited leverage in maintaining availability of workers within a region. As such, platforms often implement various policies, including offering financial incentives and/or communicating customer demand to workers in order to direct more workers to regions with shortage in supply. This research examines how behavioral biases such as regret aversion may influence workers’ relocation decisions and ultimately the system performance. A combination of behavioral modeling and controlled lab experiments is used in this study. We develop analytical models that incorporate regret aversion to produce theoretical predictions, which are then tested and verified via a series of controlled lab experiments. Results show that regret aversion plays an important role in workers’ relocation decisions. Regret averse workers are more willing to relocate to the supply-shortage zone than rational workers. This increased relocation behavior, however, is not sufficient to translate to a better system performance. Platform interventions, such as demand information sharing and dynamic wage bonus, can help further improve the system. We find that workers’ regret-aversion behavior may lead to an increased profit for the platform, a higher surplus for the workers, and an improved demand-supply matching efficiency, thus benefiting the entire on-demand system.


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